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A CLOSED-FORM SOLUTION
TO A MODEL OF TWO-SIDED,
PARTIAL ALTRUISM
ANA FERNANDES
University of Bern
This paper presents a closed-form characterization of the allocation of resources in an
overlapping generations model of two-sided, partial altruism. Three assumptions are
made: (i) parents and children play Markov strategies, (ii) utility takes the CRRA form,
and (iii) the income of children is stochastic but proportional to the saving of parents. In
families where children are rich relative to their parents, saving rates—measured as a
function of the family’s total resources—are higher than when children are poor relative to
their parents. Income redistribution from the old to the young, therefore, leads to an
increase in aggregate saving.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous presence of the family in many aspects of decision-making—from
human capital investments by the young [Becker (1993)] to the role of financial
transfers among kin in the distribution of wealth and persistence of inequality
[Becker and Tomes (1979), Loury (1981)]—has long been recognized in the
literature. Models of the family are especially important in analyzing topics that
involve resource redistribution across generations, such as the implementation of
social security programs; altruism has been a recurrent paradigm in this context
[see, e.g., Barro (1974), Becker (1974), Laitner (1979, 1988)].
Dynamic models of the altruistic family typically involve generalizations of the
overlapping-generations framework.1 The utility of old agents at a given moment
in time no longer depends solely on their own consumption path; it is affected by
the well-being of their descendants. The models used range from assuming very
strong family ties—people value the utility of their descendants as much as their
own—to considering less extreme views of affection across kinship, whereby
the utility of a family member is somewhat discounted relative to one’s own.2
In this literature, altruism is generally considered to be one-sided, with parents
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caring about children and children caring about their children—but not about
their parents. One important reason for this one-sidedness has been the analytical
difficulty of obtaining tractable characterizations of the family’s choices otherwise.
The roots of the problem are sketched below.3
Altruistic family members will donate income to less wealthy relatives to equal-
ize the marginal utility from consumption. This equalization will not be full in the
case of partial altruism, as the utility of relatives is less valued than one’s own.
In a static environment of two-sided altruism, this implies that transfers will flow
from parents to children when parents are wealthy relative to their children, from
children to parents otherwise, and that there will be an intermediate range where
no transfers take place, where parent and child have similar incomes and where
each would like to receive transfers from the other family member. Consider now
the utility the parent derives from consumption. Let us fix the child’s income and
examine what happens as the parent’s income increases. For low income values,
the parent receives a transfer from the child. An additional unit of income is
“taxed” by the child in the form of a transfer reduction. As parental income rises,
transfers decrease until they become exactly zero. At this point, additional parental
income reverts fully to parental consumption, as the child cannot impose a negative
transfer on the parent. The marginal utility from consumption therefore increases
locally in a discrete fashion (seen from the point of view of the parental utility from
consumption, the utility function has an upward kink at the point where transfers
from the child are exactly zero).4 This causes concavity of the value function to
break down and prevents standard theorems—to demonstrate existence of a value
function summarizing parental future utility—from being used. Instead, people
have resorted either to full altruism (no kink exists, because transfers are always
positive and fully equalize consumption across family members) or to one-sided
altruism (there is a kink at the point where the parent’s income is high enough to
trigger transfers to a poorer child but the value function remains concave).5
This paper presents a closed-form characterization of the allocation of resources
(consumption and saving) in an overlapping generations (OLG) model of two-
sided, partial altruism. Under the assumptions that (i) parents and children play
Markov strategies, (ii) utility takes the CRRA form, and (iii) the income of children
is stochastic but proportional to the saving of parents, it is possible to solve
explicitly for optimal consumption, transfers (from parents to children or from
children to parents), and saving, as well as for the value function summarizing the
utility parents derive from the future. As in the static setup, partial altruism causes
transfers to flow from wealthy relatives to relatively poorer family members, but
not to take place at all whenever incomes are sufficiently close. It is shown that
the saving decisions of young dynasty members are a function of the total income
of the family. In fact, when interfamily transfers flow from the old to the young
(bequests), the family saves a smaller share of its total resources compared to
the case where the young provide the older cohort with transfers (gifts). The
consumption of the old cohort is also a higher fraction of the family’s total income
when bequests are positive compared to the old’s consumption share when the
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young provide positive gifts. When intergenerational transfers are zero, family
members act independently and kinship is an irrelevant consideration for economic
decisions such as saving or consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section
3 provides a parametric example. Section 4 concludes.
2. AN OLG MODEL WITH TWO-SIDED, PARTIAL ALTRUISM
2.1. Preferences
The environment is that of a standard OLG model with partial altruism [see
Laitner (1988)]. Each family member lives for two periods. When young, the
child coexists with the parent. In the second period, she raises her own child. In
the following period, that child will raise her grandchild. The extended family is
therefore infinitely lived.
Parent and child value each other’s utility but by less than they value their
own. Consider a parent–child pair. Let Vp denote the parent’s forward-looking
utility associated with decisions concerning the present date and the entire future.
Similarly, let Vc denote the child’s lifetime utility, and cp and cc stand for parent’s
and child’s consumption, respectively. For numbers β, λH , λL ∈ (0, 1) and λH >
λL, consider the following system:
Vp = λHu(cp) + λLVc, (1)
Vc = λH [u (cc) + βVp′ ] + λLVp. (2)
The function Vp′ represents the utility accruing to the young agents in the second
period of their lives, because they will be old then and therefore assume the
role of parents. The assumption λH > λL reflects the partial nature of altruism:
individuals value their direct utility more than they value that of their relatives.
Solving the system (1) and (2), we get
Vp = λH1 − λ2L
u(cp) + λHλL1 − λ2L
[u (cc) + βVp′ ], (3)
Vc = λHλL1 − λ2L
u(cp) + λH1 − λ2L
[u (cc) + βVp′ ]. (4)
We may define ˜λH ≡ λH/(1 − λ2L) and ˜λL ≡ λHλL/(1 − λ2L). There is no
guarantee that ˜λH and ˜λL are in the interval (0, 1) and, in particular, it is also
possible that the new discount factor in Vc, βλH/(1 − λ2L), is not in this interval.
It may be convenient, therefore, to impose restrictions on λH and λL so that the
discount factor lies strictly in the unit interval. But the general idea that each agent
weighs more the utility from own consumption than the utility of other family
members goes through, in (3) and (4).
Also, parents discount the future more than their children, as the term multi-
plying β in Vp, λHλL/(1 − λ2L), is strictly smaller than the corresponding term in
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Vc, λH/(1 − λ2L). The reason for this has to do with the fact that they value the
future indirectly, through their child’s future consumption, which they value less
than their own consumption.
In what follows, I will use the preference format of (3) and (4) to motivate the
functional forms
Vp = λu(cp) + (1 − λ) [u (cc) + βVp′ ], (5)
Vc = (1 − λ) u(cp) + λ[u (cc) + βVp′ ], (6)
where λ ∈ (0.5, 1).
2.2. A Dynasty
Equations (5) and (6) characterize the preferences of old and young agents, re-
spectively. Let us now turn to other aspects of the extended family. Nature acts at
the beginning of every period of this infinite-horizon game by drawing the income
of young agents, zt . Parental income is assumed nonstochastic, for simplicity. Old
agents in period t have income atR, where at represents assets accumulated from
period t − 1, which yields the exogenous return R.6
Each agent moves in two adjacent periods. When he is born, he observes his
income and his parent’s resources and decides on a nonnegative transfer to the
parent, gt , and on the amount of savings to accumulate for the following period,
at+1. At time t , the parent (who was born in period t − 1) observes zt and
decides how to split the resources atR into own consumption and a nonnegative
transfer to the child, bt . Both parent and child know the entire past history of
endowment realizations, transfers, and asset accumulation decisions made by
other dynasty members. Their choices of gifts, savings, and bequest—the agents’
strategies—map the entire set of past decisions and income realizations, as well as
the income realizations of the period in which they move, into the nonnegative real
numbers. In addition, strategies are additionally constrained to verify bt , gt ≥ 0,
gt + at+1 ≤ zt + bt , and bt ≤ atR + gt .7
At time t , for fixed interest rate R, given resources at , zt and decisions
bt , gt , at+1, consumption is given by
cpt = atR − bt + gt , (7)
cct = zt + bt − gt − at+1. (8)
2.3. Markov Perfect Equilibria
To characterize subgame-perfect equilibria, one could use the ideas of self-
generation and factorization, from Abreu et al. (1986, 1990), and determine the
set of lifetime discounted utilities associated with subgame-perfect strategies of
this infinite game. A more restrictive procedure, which also confines attention to
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Markov perfect strategies, would be to find a solution to a functional equation, as
follows.
Consider a space of functions with domain in R2, F(R2). Suppose that V ∈
F(R2) satisfies the functional equation
V (a, z) = max
b
{
λu (aR − b + g)
+ (1 − λ)
[
u(z + b − g − a′) + β
∫
V (a′, z′)µ(dz′)
]}
(9)
subject to
g, a′ ∈ arg max
{
(1 − λ) u (aR − b + g)
+ λ
[
u(z + b − g − a′) + β
∫
V (a′, z′)µ(dz′)
]}
. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) characterize one Markov perfect equilibrium. The gain
from using this very restrictive approach will be shown in the next section: the para-
metric example solved below enables a complete characterization of the function
V (·) as well as of the optimal choices (b, g, a′) as functions of the state (a, z).
3. A PARAMETRIC EXAMPLE
In this section, I assume that the income of the child is stochastic but proportional
to her parent’s saving. Say the parent saves a, which earns the deterministic return
R. The child’s resources are the product of the stochastic shock z and the parent’s
saving a. Therefore, changes in a affect the income of both parent and child in
the same direction, something that would tend to reduce potential disincentives to
save; these could arise from the fact that, from altruism, children know they will
not appropriate the totality of their saved income if their own children turn out to
be poor, and, by saving more, the current generation also reduces the likelihood
that their children will transfers resources to them in the future. Together with
CRRA utility, the fact that changes in a do not affect the ratio of parent’s to
child’s resources suggests that decision rules will be proportional to a, therefore
eliminating the potential lack of global concavity of V (·) with respect to a. This
will indeed be the case, as shown below.
Is the assumption of stochastic proportionality of incomes plausible? Although
its analytical convenience is undeniable, it is not as restrictive as it may at first
appear. In fact, the overlapping-generations model as it now stands could be
calibrated to reproduce a certain degree of mean reversion around a by allowing the
distribution of the next period’s shocks, z′, to depend on today’s shock realization,
z, as in a Markov process.8 As long as the distribution of future shocks does not
depend on current or past values of a, the analysis goes through.
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TABLE 1. Optimal consumption and savings
Medium z
b = g = 0
Low z High z
b > 0 zl zh g > 0
cp λ[1 −β(1 − λ)]a(z+R) Ra (1 − λ)[1 −β(1 − λ)]1 −β + 2βλ a(R + z)
cc (1 − λ)(1 −β(1 − λ))a(z+R) 1 −β(1 − λ)1 +βλ az λ[1 −β(1 − λ)]1 −β + 2βλ a(z+R)
a′ β(1 − λ)a(z+R) β1 +βλ az βλ1 −β + 2βλ a(z+R)
Given resources a and the realization of z, once transfers b, g and current
savings a′ are determined, consumption of family members is now given by
cp = aR − b + g and cc = az + b − g − a′.
Within CRRA, I choose logarithmic utility, as this particular choice provides
more insightful results. With the choice u(c) = log(c), I guess that V (a, z) =
f (z, R) + Blog(a), a strictly concave function in a. The guess is verified for
B = 1/[1 − β(1 − λ)].9 With the properties of V given above, it is easy to see
that, for small values of z (relative to R), transfers flow from parents to children;
the converse happens if z is sufficiently high, whereas intermediate realizations
of this random variable are associated with no transfers taking place at all. The
results are presented in Table 1.10
The values of z that divide the transfer regimes are given by
zl = (1 − λ)
λ
[
1 + βλ
1 − β (1 − λ)
]
R and zh = λ1 − λ
[
1 + βλ
1 − β (1 − λ)
]
R.
Several things are worth noting, concerning the results in Table 1. First, if we
consider the extreme case λ = 0.5 (full, rather than partial, altruism), the table
collapses into a single column: transfers will always be positive and completely
equalize consumption across family members for all values of z and R. The fact
that altruism is partial, λ ∈ (0.5, 1), ensures that zl < zh and gives rise to the three
different transfer regimes.
As in a static context, transfers flow from wealthy family members to less well-
off relatives. When z < zl , the parent provides positive transfers to the child. For
z > zh, the child provides gifts to the parent. For intermediate realizations of z,
zl < z < zh, no transfers take place.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this problem is the fact that optimal
consumption and savings decisions are generally functions of the family’s total
resources, (R + z)a. In fact, we have cj = cj (a, R, z), for j = p, c. Similarly,
a′ = a′(a, R, z). It is only when z ∈ (zl, zh) that individual consumption is a
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function of that family member’s income, and savings depends on the child’s
income alone. When transfers are positive (either low or high realizations of the
shock z), optimal consumption and savings are expressed as a constant fraction of
the family’s total resources, a(R + z).
In regimes with either b > 0 or g > 0, the family member providing the
transfers is solving a Pareto problem of maximizing a weighted sum of utilities
subject to the total resources of the family. Comparing the low-z with the high-z
regimes, we see that the parent’s marginal propensity to consume out of total
resources is highest when the parent himself is providing the transfers. In fact,
parental consumption equals the fraction λ[1 − β(1 − λ)] of total family income
when parental transfers are positive and only (1−λ)[1−β(1−λ)]/(1−β +2βλ)
when the child provides positive transfers to the parent. This is not a surprising
outcome: the transfer giver places the highest weight on his own direct well-being.
Likewise, the child’s marginal propensity to consume and save out of the family’s
total resources is highest when the child provides positive transfers to the parent.
When gifts are positive, the saving rate is βλ/(1 − β + 2βλ), compared to only
β(1 − λ), when parents transfer resources to children.
Consider now the Ricardian equivalence experiment of lump-sum income redis-
tribution across generations. Say that the government manages to transfer income
from the parent and give it to the child, while keeping the family’s total resources
a(R + z) constant. If this transfer causes a change in transfer regime to take place
(either by moving the family from a positive bequest region to a no-transfer or
to a positive gift regime), then it will lead to an increase in saving and in the
child’s consumption at the expense of a reduction in the consumption of the old
generation. This nonneutrality is also a property of the static models of partial
altruism. If the income transfer leaves the family in the same positive transfer
regime (either bequests or gifts), then nothing changes: consumption and saving
remain unchanged and Ricardian equivalence prevails.
Although it is not obvious from the table, saving is a constant fraction of the
saver’s after-transfer income. In the same spirit of lump-sum redistribution as
before, consider the comparison across different families whose total income is
the same, a(R + z), but where ownership of resources differs. Rank families in
increasing order of the child’s income, az. When bequests are provided, the child’s
after-transfer income, az + b, is less than the corresponding amount she will get
when gifts are given, az − g. As a consequence, total saving will also be lower
in the positive bequest regime. Despite the constant saving rate measured as a
function of the after-transfer income, the examination of individual saving data
would suggest that the saving rate of the child—measured in terms of her income
az—is monotonically decreasing in her income [except in the range (azl, azh),
where it would stay constant].
How does saving vary with the intensity of altruism—i.e., as λ decreases? In
the positive bequest region, lower λ makes the old care more about the young and
raises the amount of the bequest. The young receive a larger transfer and they
raise saving. In this regime, altruism raises the saving rate. In the positive gift
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TABLE 2. Saving rates and limits of transfer intervals as functions of λ
λ 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
sh/sl 1 1.12 1.26 1.45 1.69 2.03 2.55 3.4 5.11 10.24
zh/zl 1 1.49 2.25 3.45 5.44 9 16 32.11 81 361
region, lower λ indicates that the young value the well-being of the old more and,
consequently, provide a greater gift to them. Saving is therefore reduced. In the
no-transfer regime, saving rates are decreasing functions of λ, as this parameter
also measures the intensity of altruism regarding the children of the current savers.
These changes in saving and consumption choices across transfer regimes in-
troduce an element of heterogeneity across families with the same total income
but where the distribution of resources varies. One consequence of this analysis
is, therefore, the breakdown of the representative family or household paradigm.
Another implication of the analysis is the separation between income inequality
and the distribution of well-being. The fact that transfers partly equalize differences
in living standards implies that the distribution of consumption across individuals
will have lower variance than the distribution of income; in fact, transfers will
transform pairs of extreme income observations (very high and very low) into
pairs of more balanced consumption outcomes.
Let sh = sh(λ) denote the saving rate out of total familial resources when
z > zh. Define sl = sl(λ) to be the saving rate for realizations of z below zl .
Table 2 computes the ratio sh/sl for varying values of λ in the interval (0.5, 1). It
also shows how the ratio zh/zl varies with λ.
From Table 2, we see that small departures from the full altruism benchmark of
λ = 0.5 have important consequences for the saving rate as well as for the income
differential needed to trigger transfers. With λ = 0.65, for example, the saving
rate associated with positive gifts is roughly one and one-half times as high as
the one prevailing under positive bequests; also, a child providing to her progeny
earns now approximately three and one-half times as much as a child receiving
parental transfers. These magnitudes naturally increase with λ, as we move further
away from full altruism.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper provided a closed-form solution to a model of two-sided, partial al-
truism. The most important assumption in overcoming the typical breakdown of
value-function concavity—a consequence of partial altruism—was the propor-
tionality of parent’s and child’s income. As argued, this seemingly restrictive
assumption is compatible with conventional income processes and well suited to
replicate, for example, mean reversion in intergenerational income.
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The analysis draws attention to an interesting tension between intergenera-
tional mobility and income inequality at a point in time. Partial altruism implies
that families pooling resources are those in which income is relatively dissimilar
across their members. Those families whose differences in income are largest will
reallocate resources in order to reduce differences in wellbeing. Consequently,
partial altruism suggests that accurate measurement of wealth inequality must
take into account the degree of persistence of income across generations. In fact,
individual well-being depends not only on individual wealth but also on how
the wealth of a particular individual ranks among that of his family members.
Quantifying the importance of altruism in the reduction of income inequality is
the object of ongoing research.
NOTES
1. Samuelson (1958).
2. See Laitner (1997) for a survey.
3. As is common in the altruism literature, attention is restricted to the case where the utility of an
agent at a moment in time is a weighted sum of his own direct utility from consumption and that of
his relatives (parent and/or child). See Laitner (1997).
4. This is trivially true of the parent’s own marginal utility from consumption. More importantly,
it is also true if one considers the parent’s total marginal utility from consumption, a weighted sum of
his direct marginal utility from consumption and that of his child, as long as the weight placed on his
own direct utility exceeds the one placed on the child’s.
5. Laitner (1988) considers two-sided partial altruism; there, parents are allowed to invest in
lotteries and this restores concavity to the value function.
6. All the results in this paper are robust to having parental income be stochastic, in-
stead, as long as the ratio of parental to child’s income remains independent of the parent’s
actions.
7. The action space for the parent—bt ∈ [0, atR + gt ]—for example, depends on thetransfer
received from the child. Also, the set of feasible values for the child’s choices of gift and savings
depend on the parent’s action bt . The utility of all family members is still a well-defined object, for
each feasible action bt , gt , and at+1, in all time periods t . In fact, it is not possible to write down action
sets that are independent of the players’ actions, in the more general formulation of this game, without
imposing artificial limits on the transfer and savings choices. In the subset of Markov perfect equilibria,
discussed below, we could refine the limits on transfers as follows. Optimal parental transfers, bt , will
be contained in [0, atR], and the child’s optimal choice of gift, gt , will only take values in the interval
[0, zt ]. However, the child’s choice of savings will depend on the parental bequest, even in the subset
of Markov perfect strategies, because positive parental transfers will induce higher savings. One could,
as in Laitner (1988), impose that savings are chosen after transfer decisions are implemented. Given
the sequential nature of choices, savings would then be a function of the child’s total income after
transfers: zt + bt . This modification would have no implications for Markov perfect strategies or the
results of the parametric example of Section 3, and the simultaneous choice of transfers and savings is
therefore maintained here.
8. See Mulligan (1999) for a comparison of different theories of intergenerational income dynamics.
9. For general CRRA utility, with u(c) = c1−σ /(1−σ), the guess V (a, z) = f (z)+Ba1−σ /(1−σ)
is verified for the same value of B as above.
10. The function f (z, R) falls in one of three ranges, corresponding to the possibilities z ≤ zl ,
z ∈ (zl , zh), and z > zh. Say that f 1(z, R) corresponds to the functional form associated with the
lowest interval of z values, and that f 2(·) and f 3(·) are those associated with the other intervals.
Simple but tedious algebra shows that f 1(zl , R) = f 2(zl , R), and f 2(zh, R) = f 3(zh, R).
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